Deep integration of hydrogen technology and blockchain.
A rough model of what it looks like from the outside to the common user.
There is a car that has a generator to convert water into hydrogen fuel. The car runs on water.
The user has a cryptocurrency tokenized token.
The user goes to the website - fueling station.
Transfers the desired number of tokens to the address of the fueling station.
How many tokens are deposited at the address of the fueling station, that much "virtual water" is filled into the "virtual fuel tank" of the car.
The vehicle has a fuel tank with "real water" and "virtual water" in it
Software synchronizes "virtual water" and "real water"
When "real water" or "virtual water" is finished in, the generator stops processing real water and the engine stalls.
The "real and virtual water" synchronization software looks like a "watchdog worm virus".
This "worm" is in a passive state.
The passive state of the "worm" looks like tracking real water consumption. And how much real water is consumed, the same amount of virtual water the worm "chews out".
For example, if 3 liters of water turned into hydrogen fuel, the "worm" chews off a notional 3 bits of the virtual water file.
The engine stalls in one of three conditions, if there is no "real water" in the fuel tank, or if there is no "virtual water", or if both fuel tanks are empty. Both fuel tanks must be full for the engine to start.
Water is free, it can be taken everywhere from any river, rain, sea. However, virtual fuel can be bought only with tokens.
Fighting abusers.
Since hydrogen technology is deeply integrated into the blockchain, there could be an attacker who wants to look at and change the program code, and thus decouple hydrogen technology from the blockchain and drive around without paying to convert water into hydrogen fuel.
This is why there is a "watchdog worm virus", which goes into active mode after a code change. It mutates and starts destroying software.
Destroys the "virtual water", destroys the altered code. It actively reproduces and clogs the memory of the device that controls the water-to-fuel generator.
According to how much the "worm" knows from which crypto wallet address the payment of virtual water occurred, it tells the "virtual gas station" this address.
And the "virtual gas station" puts the address of the attacker's crypto wallet on the stop list, and from this wallet it is impossible to pay for virtual fuel and start the car on water.
If the attacker transfers tokens to another crypto wallet address, the "virtual refueling" looks through the transactions of the new crypto wallet and sees that tokens from the attacker's wallet came to it and puts the new crypto wallet in the stop list.
In this way, the attacker is deprived of the opportunity to obtain virtual fuel.
Without "virtual fuel", the water-to-fuel conversion generator code is incomplete and it is impossible to analyze an incomplete code.
Thus it is impossible to separate hydrogen technology from blockchain. The attacker loses his tokens. He can sell them, but no one will buy his tokens from him, because the blockchain records are public and everyone can check whether the tokens have passed through the attacker's wallets before buying them.
This is an initial and approximate deep integration technology, visible from the user side.
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